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Abstract: How does the result of elections in non-ideal 
situations behave? When, e.g., there is vote buying 
strategy occurring into the election process. This 
article investigates this point using a virtual election 
through an agent-based model environment. Building 
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a tool for policymakers to test possible scenarios in a 
virtual environment before to apply in real world. In 
our model candidates have a limited campaign period 
to convince the residents to vote for them. They visit 
the houses of the residents to explain their campaign 
promises and sometimes offer a bribe. We have found 
that the existence of bribes can change the election 
results only if some other factors are also present. The 
result of an election can be modified when the values 
are given to voters as bribes are high, or the voters 
have no kind of memory. Also, the period of the elec-
toral campaign can facilitate changes in the result, the 
bigger the period, easy to change an electoral result.
Keywords: vote; parliamentary mandate; buying 
votes.
Resumo: Como se comporta o resultado das eleições 
em situações não ideais? Quando, por exemplo, existe 
uma estratégia de compra de votos durante o processo 
de eleição. Este artigo investiga este ponto usando 
uma eleição virtual através de um modelo baseado 
em agente, pode servir como uma ferramenta para os 
formadores de política, apto a testar cenários possíveis 
em um ambiente virtual antes de aplicar na prática. 
Em nosso modelo os candidatos têm um período de 
campanha limitado para convencer os eleitores a vo-
tar neles. Os candidatos visitam as residências para 
explicar suas promessas de campanha, e às vezes 
oferecem um suborno. Como resultados vimos que a 
existência de subornos pode alterar os resultados das 
eleições, mas somente se outros fatores também esti-
verem presentes. O resultado de uma eleição pode ser 
modificado quando os valores ofertados aos eleitores 
como subornos são elevados, ou se os eleitores não 
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têm nenhum tipo de memória. Além disso, o período 
de campanha eleitoral pode facilitar mudanças no re-
sultado, quanto maior o período, mais fácil de mudar 
um resultado eleitoral.
Palavras chave: voto; mandato parlamentar; compra 
de votos.
1 Introduction
Although in the theory of representative democracy 
elections are summed up in the contest between the candi-
dates, fighting for votes of the voters, in practice it is not so 
simple. This interaction between the different actors involves 
considerable resources, as pointed by Speck (2003, p. 148). 
However, campaign money is not only used lawfully. Several 
studies have shown that there are illicit ways of persuad-
ing the voter to vote for a candidate, a practice commonly 
known as “buying votes” (e.g., Abramo, 2007, p. 8; Speck, 
2003, p. 160; Brusco et al., 2004, p. 70; Gonzalez-Ocantos et 
al., 2012, p. 210). In Brusco et al. (2004, p. 66) the purchase 
of votes is defined as the offer of money or other consumer 
goods by political parties or candidates in exchange for the 
promise of their vote. This is what we also use here as the 
purchase of votes. 
Several papers highlight the importance of financial 
resources for an electoral campaign (Cox, Thies, 2000, p. 40; 
Jacobson, 1985, p. 183; Green, Krasno, 1988, p. 900; and Speck, 
Mancuso, 2014, p. 34, among others). In this sense, studies 
show that the resources expended with electoral campaigns 
also depend on different factors, such as whether the candi-
date seeks re-election (Jacobson, 1985, p. 55; Jacobson, 1990, 
p. 334), or the sex of the candidates (Samuels, 2000, p. 490). 
WHAT IS NEEDED TO CHANGE THE RESULT OF AN ELECTION
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 116 | pp. 497-514 | jan./jun. 2018
500
Yet, we have seen in Brazil that the political parties play a 
decisive role in the election, as pointed out by De Souza and 
Mezzaroba (2015, p. 302).
In order to have an idea of the effect of this practice on 
electoral campaigns Samuels (2001, p. 580) have shown that 
the offer of certain lottery tickets, and even a small tangible 
reward as coffee, have a small, but significant impact on in-
creasing voter turnout. However, the literature indicates that 
the proportion of voters receiving vote-buying offers varies 
per various characteristics, such as the region and unit of the 
federation where the electoral campaign occurs; whether the 
city is capital or interior; age; income; and educational level 
of the voters; etc. (Speck, 2003, p. 155; Abramo, 2007, p. 2).
Since the purchase of votes exists, there is no simple 
way to analyze how financial resources can affect an elec-
tion, since the numbers resulting from this practice may be 
sufficient to change the outcome of a dispute (Abramo et al., 
2007, p. 5). So, a question arises: can a candidate’s financial 
resources even change the outcome of an election? Based on 
the use of an agent-based model, this paper seeks to analyze 
the impact of financial resources on election campaigns; 
estimating how much it would take for the outcome of an 
election to be changed and to test cases where voters have 
some kind of memory.
The research is justified because the distortions caused 
by the candidates’ financial resources may oppose the demo-
cratic character of the elections, which allow politicians to 
come to power and deal with private interests rather than 
their constituencies. That generate inefficiencies, that is since 
the candidate elected uses the unidentified money to buy 
votes he will need to take it back. For example, Khemani 
(2013, p. 90), using data from Philippines elections, shows 
evidence that buying votes in poor economies is associated 
with the lower provision of public services.
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This article is structured as follows: this section pre-
sented the contextualization of our theme, problem, and 
objective of the research; next section presents the model 
used to estimate our results; followed by a section which 
presents the results obtained; and, a brief conclusion with 
our final considerations.
2 Model4
To simulate an electoral campaign, we used a virtual 
city with 10,000 residents. It is assumed that all the residents 
will vote, and they are distributed into 2,500 residences. The 
sick the reality we attribute an age properties to our agents. 
We divide the population into groups. Which one is divided 
into four bands with the following proportions showed in 
Table 1. These proportions were chosen to mimic the real 
Brazilian age distribution taken from TSE data for 2016. 
Table 1 - Proportion of voters by age group.
Age group (years)
16 – 24
25 – 34
35 – 60
61 or more
Percentage of total voters (%)
15
22
46
17
Source: Prepared by the authors, based on TSE data (2016).
4 The code was write an opensource platform, it is available at: http://
modelingcommons.org/account/models/712
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Two candidates here called Candidates A and Candi-
date B, are in a run for the city mayor. We will assume that 
the Candidate A has as main campaign promises: greater 
investments in health and education. Candidate B has its 
main campaign promises: job creation and tax reduction.
Each candidate visits several homes per day during the 
electoral period. In the corrupt case, the candidate makes an 
M (value of the bribe) offer of money to buy the votes. The 
election campaign period is composed of 100 days. There-
fore, candidates may not be able to visit all the houses of the 
municipality and offer a bribe to all voters of the city.
Voters respect a utility function, depending on their 
interests, which will vary per age; and give different weights 
for each of those promises. Based on that they make their 
voting decisions (Table 2). In other words, a head of the fam-
ily, who is more concerned with the health and education of 
his children, would vote for Candidate A; instead, a young 
person, who tends to be starting his professional career, 
would like Candidate B to choose, because, e.g., it must be 
worried about finding or maintain a good job.
Table 2 - Weights assigned to each campaign pro-
mise per age range of the voters.
Promise Weight attributed by age group (%)
16 – 24 25 – 34 35 – 60 61 or more
(1) Health 10 10 25 40
(2) Education 25 10 25 25
(3) Employment 40 40 25 25
(4) Tax reduction 25 40 25 10
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Two models are proposed: one honest and other cor-
rupt. In the honest system, the candidates and the voters are 
honest, so voting decisions and the campaign promises will 
be fulfilled as announced. It is assumed that every 1% that the 
voter attributes to the candidate’s main campaign promise 
is equivalent to one more unity in his utility function.
For example, a voter who is in the first age group, who 
assigns importance of 10% for health, 25% for education, 40% 
for employment and 25% for tax reduction. It will have a 
utility of 35 if Candidate A is elected and 65 if the Candidate 
B is elected. This can be summarized as:
U( xt )=U(xAt )+U(xBt ),   (1)
in which U( xt ) is the utility of the voter x in period t 
and U(xAt ) and U(xBt ) are the utilities of the voter attributed 
to the victory of candidates’ A and B, respectively. That 
is, if candidate A wins the elections, U( xt )=U(xAt ), because 
U(xBt) = 0. And the utility which is perceived from each can-
didate will depends of theirs promises, like this:
where Di is a dummy which assigns value 1 if the can-
didate makes the campaign promise i, check Table 2 (can be 
health, education, employment, or tax reduction), or zero if 
the candidate did not offer that promise. And ρi is the weight 
assigned to each of the campaign promises by the voter. 
In the honest dispute, the candidates in the electoral race 
get votes and will be elected the one whose majority of the 
population gives more weight to their campaign promises.
In the corrupt system, both voters and politicians are 
corrupt. In this case, voters accept the bribe offered by the 
U(xAt )=∑(i=1)Di ρi ,  and  U(xBt )=∑(i=1)Di ρi (2)
n n
WHAT IS NEEDED TO CHANGE THE RESULT OF AN ELECTION
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 116 | pp. 497-514 | jan./jun. 2018
504
candidate who requests their vote and ends up changing 
their utility; generated a new utility mixed by their promises 
plus the monetary value receives: 
U(xAt )=∑(i=1)Di ρi +Mt  and  U(xBt )=∑(i=1)Di ρi+Mt , (3)
n n
where Mt is the monetary value given by the candidate 
to the voter to vote for him in period t.
The utility was used as proxies to know in whom 
the voters have the intention to vote. In this case, when 
M → ∞ the probability of the voter voting for the candidate 
who offered a bribe will tend to 1, thus reducing the likeli-
hood of voting on the competitor to zero. Therefore, the odds 
assigned by voters to campaign promises were suppressed 
by the bribe. 
It should be noted that all voters vote, that is, voting is 
mandatory. And, to put it simply, without loss of generality, 
it is assumed that the 10,000 voters of that municipality reside 
in it and that the null votes are not possible. The next section 
presents the procedures adopted and the results obtained.
3 Procedure and results
Case: Honest Election
The way we settled the model in a fair election the Can-
didate B must win. That happens because we create a city 
that represents the age distribution of a typic Brazilian city, 
and the combinations of the utilities will give the Candidate 
B the victory, as shown in Table 3. Just as an example, we 
run the model with the data of the Japanese demography. 
Everything being equal, and just change the demography 
data for one like the Japanese one, the results of an election 
would be different, with the Candidate A being elected.
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Table 3: Results of an honest election.
Demography Votes for Candidate A Votes for Candidate B Winner
Brazilian 4,355 5,645 Candidate B
Japanese 5,240 4,760 Candidate A
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Case: Voters without memory
In this first cycle of simulations voters’ preferences 
are permanently altered by the bribe, this means that the 
voter does not return to their original preferences in the 
next election. It leads the adjacent election the result of their 
preference modified by the bribe if it was received one. We 
simulated 50,000 elections. On fair terms Candidate B would 
win all those elections, however, the introduction of bribes, 
even at the lowest simulated value, modified this conclusion 
and brought victories to Candidate A (see Table 4).
Table 4 – Elections with voters without memory, 
deferent value of bribes. Even the lowest value of 
bribe is enough to change the elections results 
when the voters have no memory.
Bribes value
Average votes for 
candidate A
Average votes 
for candidate B
Total wins of 
candidate A
Total wins of 
candidate B
5 4,859 ± 451 5,141 ± 442 3,000 7,000
10 4,884 ± 440 5,116 ± 456 4,000 6,000
15 5,013 ± 654 4,987 ± 650 4,000 6,000
20 4,881 ± 470 5,119 ± 491 4,700 5,300
25 4,819 ± 858 5,181 ± 821 5,000 5,000
Total 4,891 5,109 20,700 29,300
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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This configuration has brought us interesting results, 
but we do not need to maintain the restriction of only one 
candidate offers bribes per electoral cycle, so we relax this 
assumption. The results for this new case - both candidates 
offer bribes - are compiled in Table 5. There is a reduction 
in the standard deviation, the variation of votes received be-
tween one election and another is smaller than that observed 
in the previous case. Nevertheless, in some elections, the Can-
didate A can win. This does not occur in the first two levels 
of bribes; but after 50,000 simulated elections, Candidate A 
received 8,900 victories, compared to 20,700 in the previous 
scenario, that is, Candidate A has his victories reduced.
Table 5 - Elections with voters without memory, 
a different value of bribes, both candidates offer 
bribes. The situation when both candidates offer 
bribes turns more difficult to change the election 
results.
Bribes value
Average votes for 
candidate A
Average votes for 
candidate B
Total wins of 
candidate A
Total wins of 
candidate B
5 4,584 ± 208 5,415 ± 217 0 10,000
10 4,720 ± 188 5,279 ± 199 0 10,000
15 4,899 ± 162 5,100 ± 170 3,500 6,500
20 4,906 ± 147 5,093 ± 152 2,400 7,600
25 4,931 ± 135 5,068 ± 140 3,000 7,000
Total 4,808 5,109 8,900 41,100
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Case: Voters with memory
Now we will analyze the simulations where the voters 
have memory, after the electoral cycle the voter returns to 
his original preferences, that is, he remembers his original 
preferences without the interference of the bribe. In the pre-
vious studies, voters carried to the next electoral cycle their 
ultimate utility of the previous electoral cycle.
Table 6 - Voters with memory, different values of 
bribes, only one candidate buys votes. The me-
mory makes more difficult to change the elections 
results, even with only one candidate offering 
bribe the results are changed only for high values 
of bribes.
Bribes value Average votes for 
candidate A
Average votes for 
candidate B
Total wins of 
candidate A
Total wins of 
candidate B
5 4,536 ± 60 5,464 ± 88 0 10,000
10 4,697 ± 58 5,303 ± 114 0 10,000
15 4,858 ± 69 5,142 ± 143 0 10,000
20 4,469 ± 653 5,531 ± 587 4,200 5,800
25 4,396 ± 135 5,604 ± 798 5,000 5,000
Total 4,591 5,409 9,200 40,800
Source: Prepared by the authors.
We also analyzed the scenario where both candidates 
offer bribes and when only the candidate behind offers. For 
the case where both candidates offer bribes, Table 7, the re-
sult is the scenario of a fair election, without buying votes. In 
the ideal case the Candidate B would win the election with 
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5,645 votes; for no amount of bribe, this total of votes was 
surpassed. Although Candidate B had won all the 50,000 
elections, it finished with an average of votes inferior to the 
fair model.
When only one candidate makes a bribe offer, Table 6, 
the result of the elections is changed with the increase of the 
amount of the bribe, that is, Candidate A can elect even if 
the voters have memory, but for this it is necessary that the 
value of the bribe is high and that only one candidate offers 
bribes per electoral cycle.
Table 7 - Voters with memory, different values 
of bribes, both candidates buy votes. There is no 
change at the results of elections.
Bribes value
Average votes 
for candidate A
Average votes 
for candidate B
Total wins of 
candidate A
Total wins of 
candidate B
5 4.373 ± 45 5.627 ± 55 0 10.000
10 4.361 ± 26 5.639 ± 31 0 10.000
15 4.365 ± 46 5.635 ± 52 0 10.000
20 4.377 ± 53 5.623 ± 70 0 10.000
25 4.402 ± 59 5.598 ± 66 0 10.000
Total 4.376 5.624 0 50.000
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Case: Change number of residences visited
For the next two analyses, a total of 500,000 elections 
were simulated; we simulated the total number of residences 
visited between five and 25 per day, varying from five to five 
between each simulation. In a first part of the simulation 
was simulated the situation where both candidates can offer 
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bribes, the result, see Table 8, is that the votes received by 
Candidate A grow with the increase in the number of resi-
dences visited, at the end Candidate A won in 28% (70,700) 
of the runs.
Table 8 - Addition of residences visited, both can-
didates buy votes. More residence visited turn easy 
the job of loser candidate to change the result of 
an election.
Number of 
residences
Average votes 
for candidate A
Average votes 
for candidate B
Total wins of 
candidate A
Total wins of 
candidate B
5 4.704 ± 58 5.296 ± 58 4.200 45.800
10 4.799 ± 70 5.201 ± 70 11.900 38.100
15 4.861 ± 98 5.139 ± 98 17.500 32.500
20 4.861 ± 107 5.139 ± 107 16.800 33.200
25 4.901 ± 114 5.099 ± 114 20.300 29.700
Total 4.376 5.624 70.700 179.300
Source: Prepared by the authors.
When only one candidate offers bribes per electoral 
cycle, i.e., the situation where only the losing candidate 
attempts to buy votes in the next cycle, the number of Can-
didate A wins was higher than the first case scenario. Now 
it ends the simulations by winning 123,200 elections, repre-
senting 49% of the elections held. Contrary to the previous 
scenario, where Candidate A had won 28.3%, it is almost 
doubling the number of elections won by Candidate A.
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Table 9 - Addition of residences visited, only one 
candidate buying votes.  In this scenario the total 
of wins of Candidate A doubles.
Number of 
residences
Average votes 
for candidate A
Average votes 
for candidate B
Total wins of 
candidate A
Total wins of 
candidate B
5 4.989 ± 91 5.011 ± 91 24.200 25.800
10 4.998 ± 103 5.002 ± 103 24.500 25.500
15 4.979 ± 234 5.021 ± 234 24.800 25.200
20 4.987 ± 288 5.013 ± 288 24.800 25.200
25 4.960 ± 409 5.040 ± 409 24.900 25.100
Total 4.982 5.018 123.200 126.800
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Conclusion
In this work, we used an agent-based model to simulate 
elections and study how bribes may change this process. 
Despite the high stylization present in our assumptions, it 
was possible to verify that: (i) the results of the elections are 
altered through the introduction of the bribe; (ii) the existence 
of voter’s memory influences the outcome of the elections 
where bribes are present; and (iii) the number of residences 
visited, that is, the number of attempts to buy votes, affects 
the result of the elections. All of this is intuitive, but we think 
a model could help us to study public policies in a virtual 
environment before applying them in the real world.
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The memory of voters represents an important factor, in 
the presence of memory the difficulty for the corrupt candi-
date be elected was higher, that is, he wins a smaller amount 
of elections than he did when voters had no memory. We 
think, e.g., in real life, investment in education, or activities 
that bring to voters the past achievements of the candidates, 
that could help to increase the voter’s memory.
In a real election, it is not possible to limit the number 
of houses visits by a candidate during the electoral campaign. 
One solution would be to reduce the electoral campaign pe-
riod, that would have similar consequences, that is, increase 
the difficulty of the corrupt candidate be elected using bribes.
Yet, the value of the bribe offered by the candidates 
represents an important variable, in the initial cases, with 
low values, the behind candidate has difficulties to change 
the elections results. Also, when voters have memory, the 
corrupt candidate can only be elected if it offers much high 
values of bribes. Therefore, attitudes to limit the total amount 
dispensed in campaigns, or to equal the amount allowed for 
each candidate, could minimize the problem.
Finally, the ideal could be the absence of vote buying, 
so models like this would be unnecessary. However this 
article may yet be improved, still has possibilities for new 
extensions, such as: (i) recalculate the well-being of the vot-
ers after the election, that is, the voters have a non-static 
utility function; (ii) inclusion of a budget restriction for the 
candidate, the model does not currently have spending 
limits to the candidates, as if there were some inexhaustible 
source of resources available to the candidates; (iii) to make 
it possible for politicians to offer a bribe and the voters have 
a possibility of accepting it; among others.
WHAT IS NEEDED TO CHANGE THE RESULT OF AN ELECTION
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 116 | pp. 497-514 | jan./jun. 2018
512
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the CAPES (Co-
ordenação de aperfeiçoamento de pessoal de nível superior 
– Brazil) for financial support. We also thank for helpful 
comments and discussion two anonymous referees.
References
ABRAMO, C. W. Compra de votos nas eleições de 2006, cor-
rupção e desempenho administrativo. Relatório de Pesquisa 
Feita pelo IBOPE Opinião para a Transparência Brasil ea 
União Nacional dos Analistas e Técnicos de Finanças e Con-
trole. São Paulo, Brazil: Transparência Brasil, p. 1-9, 2007.
BRUSCO, V.; NAZARENO, M.; STOKES, S. C. Vote buying 
in Argentina. Latin American Research Review, v. 39, n. 2, 
p. 66-88, 2004.
COX, G. W.; THIES, M, F. How Much Does Money Matter? 
“Buying” Votes in Japan, 1967-1990. Comparative Political 
Studies, v. 33, n. 1, p. 37-57, 2000.
DE SOUZA, José Fernando Vidal; MEZZAROBA, Orides. 
A perda do mandato parlamentar: um olhar a partir do 
conceito de fortuna e virtù em Maquiavel. Revista Brasileira 
de Estudos Políticos, v. 111, p. 301-350, 2015.
GONZALEZ-OCANTOS, E. et al. Vote buying and social 
desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua. 
American Journal of Political Science, v. 56, n. 1, p. 202-217, 
2012.
GREEN, D. P.; KRASNO, J. S. Salvation for the Spendthrift 
Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending 
DIOGO SIGNOR, ELDER MAURICIO SILVA E RONIVALDO STEINGRABER 513
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 116 | pp. 497-514 | jan./jun. 2018
in House Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 
32, p. 884-907, 1988.
JACOBSON, G.C. Money and Votes Reconsidered: Con-
gressional Elections, 1972-1982. Public Choice, 47(2), p. 
7-62, 1985.
JACOBSON, G.C. The Effects of Campaign Spending in 
House Election: New Evidence for Old Arguments. Ame-
rican Journal of Political Science, 34, (2), p. 334-362, 1990.
KHEMANI, S. Buying votes vs. supplying public services: 
political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, n. 6339, p. 
84-93, 2013.
SAMUELS, D. J. Ambition and Competition: Explaining 
Legislative Turnover in Brazil. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 
vol.25, nº3, p. 481-497, 2000.
SAMUELS, D. J. Incumbents and Challengers on a Level 
Playing Field: Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance 
in Brazil. The Journal of Politics, vol.63, nº2, p.569-584, 2001.
SPECK, B. W. A compra de votos: uma aproximação empí-
rica. Opinião Pública, v. 9, n. 1, p. 148-169, 2003.
SPECK, B. W.; MANCUSO, W. P. A study on the impact of 
campaign finance, political capital and gender on electoral 
performance. Brazilian Political Science Review, v. 8, n. 1, 
p. 34-57, 2014.
WHAT IS NEEDED TO CHANGE THE RESULT OF AN ELECTION
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 116 | pp. 497-514 | jan./jun. 2018
514
Recebido em 17/04/2017
Aprovado em 31/07/2017
Diogo Signor
Email: diogosignor@gmail.com
Elder Mauricio Silva
Email: elder0055@gmail.com
Ronivaldo Steingraber
Email: ronivaldo.ufsc@gmail.com
